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Abstract—We study a class of distributed convex constrained
optimization problems where a group of agents aim to minimize
the sum of individual objective functions while each desires that
any information about its objective function is kept private. We
prove the impossibility of achieving differential privacy using
strategies based on perturbing the inter-agent messages with
noise when the underlying noise-free dynamics are asymptotically
stable. This justifies our algorithmic solution based on the
perturbation of individual functions with Laplace noise. To
this end, we establish a general framework for differentially
private handling of functional data. We further design post-
processing steps that ensure the perturbed functions regain the
smoothness and convexity properties of the original functions
while preserving the differentially private guarantees of the
functional perturbation step. This methodology allows us to use
any distributed coordination algorithm to solve the optimization
problem on the noisy functions. Finally, we explicitly bound the
magnitude of the expected distance between the perturbed and
true optimizers which leads to an upper bound on the privacy-
accuracy trade-off curve. Simulations illustrate our results.
Index Terms—Networks of Autonomous Agents, Optimiza-
tion, Distributed Algorithms/Control, Differential Privacy, Cyber-
Physical Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy preservation is an increasingly critical issue that
plays a key role in preventing catastrophic failures in physical
infrastructure as well as easing the social adoption of new tech-
nology. Power networks, manufacturing systems, and smart
transportation are just but a few examples of cyberphysical
applications in need of privacy-aware design of control and
coordination strategies. In these scenarios, the problem of
optimizing the operation of a group of networked resources is
a common and important task, where the individual objective
functions associated to the entities, the estimates of the opti-
mizer, or even the constraints on the optimization might reveal
sensitive information. Our work here is motivated by the goal
of synthesizing distributed coordination algorithms that solve
networked optimization problems with privacy guarantees and
high accuracy.
Literature review: Our work builds upon the existing lit-
erature of distributed convex optimization and differential
privacy. In the area of networked systems, an increasing body
of research, e.g., [1]–[6] and references therein, designs and
analyzes algorithms for distributed convex optimization both
in discrete and continuous time as well as in deterministic and
stochastic scenarios. While these works consider an ambitious
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suite of topics related to convergence and performance under
various constraints imposed by real-world applications, privacy
is an aspect generally absent in their treatment. The concept
of differential privacy [7], [8] was originally proposed for
databases of individual records subject to public queries and
has been extended to several areas thereafter. The recent
work [9] provides a comprehensive recent account of this
area. In machine learning, the problem of differentially private
optimization has received attention, see e.g. [10]–[16], as
an intermediate, usually centralized, step for solving other
learning or statistical tasks. The common paradigm is having
the sensitive information correspond to the entries of a finite
database of records or training data that usually constitute the
parameters of an additive objective function. Threat models
are varied, including releasing to the adversary the whole
sequence of internal states of the optimization process or only
the algorithm’s final output. In [10], the authors design a differ-
entially private classifier by perturbing the objective function
with a linear finite-dimensional function (hyper-plane). It is
shown in [11] that this method also works in the presence of
constraints and non-differentiable regularizers. Although this
is sufficient to preserve the privacy of the underlying finite-
dimensional parameter set (learning samples), it cannot keep
the whole objective functions private. The authors of [12]
design a sensitivity-based differentially private algorithm for
regression analysis which, instead of perturbing the optimal
weight vector, perturbs the regression cost function by in-
jecting noise into the coefficients of the quadratic truncation
of its Taylor expansion. This truncation limits the functional
space to the (finite-dimensional) space of quadratic functions.
In [13], the authors propose the addition of a sample path
of a Gaussian random process to the objective function, but
do not explore the generalization to arbitrary dimensions or
ensure the smoothness and convexity of the resulting function.
In general, the proposed algorithms are not distributed and
neither designed for nor capable of preserving the privacy
of infinite-dimensional objective functions. Furthermore, the
work in this area does not rigorously study the effect of
added noise on the global optimizer or on the smoothness and
convexity properties of the objective functions. In addition to
addressing these issues, the present treatment is applicable to
scenarios where the sensitive information consists of elements
of any separable Hilbert space, including (objective) functions
coming from the (infinite-dimensional) L2 space.
Of more relevance to our paper are recent works [17]–[19]
that are focused on differentially private distributed optimiza-
tion problems for multi-agent systems. These papers consider
as private information, respectively, the objective functions, the
optimization constraints, and the agents’ states. The underlying
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commonality is the algorithm design approach based on the
idea of message perturbation. This idea consists of adopting a
standard distributed optimization algorithm and modifying it
by having agents perturb the messages to their neighbors or
a central coordinator with Laplace or Gaussian noise. This
approach has the advantage of working with the original
objective functions and thus is easy to implement. However,
for fixed design parameters, the algorithm’s output does not
correspond to the true optimizer in the absence of noise,
suggesting the presence of a steady-state accuracy error. This
problem is addressed in [18] by terminating the algorithm after
a finite number of steps and optimizing this number offline as
a function of the desired level of privacy. Nevertheless, for
any fixed level of privacy, there exists an amount of bias in
the algorithm’s output which is not due to the added noise but
to the lack of asymptotic stability of the underlying noiseless
dynamics. To address this issue, our approach explores the
use of functional perturbation to achieve differential privacy.
The concept of functional differential privacy combines the
benefits of metrics and adjacency relations. The authors of [20]
also employ metrics instead of binary adjacency relations
in the context of differential privacy. This approach has the
advantage that the difference between the probabilities of
events corresponding to any pair of data sets is bounded by a
function of the distance between the data sets, eliminating the
need for the computation of conservative sensitivity bounds.
Statement of contributions: We consider a group of agents
that seek to minimize the sum of their individual objective
functions over a communication network in a differentially pri-
vate manner. Our first contribution is to show that coordination
algorithms which rely on perturbing the agents’ messages with
noise cannot satisfy the requirements of differential privacy if
the underlying noiseless dynamics are locally asymptotically
stable. The presence of noise necessary to ensure differential
privacy is known to affect the algorithm accuracy in solv-
ing the distributed convex optimization problem. However,
this result explains why message-perturbing strategies incur
additional inaccuracies that are present even if no noise is
added. Our second contribution is motivated by the goal of
guaranteeing that the algorithm accuracy is only affected by
the presence of noise. We propose a general framework for
functional differential privacy over Hilbert spaces and intro-
duce a novel definition of adjacency using adjacency spaces.
The latter notion is quite flexible and includes, as a special
case, the conventional bounded-difference notion of adjacency.
We carefully specify these adjacency spaces within the L2
space such that the requirement of differential privacy can be
satisfied with bounded perturbations. Our third contribution
builds on these results on functional perturbation to design
a class of distributed, differentially private coordination algo-
rithms. We let each agent perturb its own objective function
based on its desired level of privacy, and then the group
uses any provably correct distributed coordination algorithm to
optimize the sum of the individual perturbed functions. Two
challenges arise to successfully apply this strategy: the fact
that the perturbed functions might lose the smoothness and
convexity properties of the original functions and the need to
characterize the effect of the added noise on the minimizer
of the resulting problem. We address the first challenge using
a cascade of smoothening and projection steps that maintain
the differential privacy of the functional perturbation step.
We address the second challenge by explicitly bounding the
absolute expected deviation from the original optimizer using
a novel Lipschitz characterization of the argmin map. By
construction, the resulting coordination algorithms satisfy the
requirement of recovering perfect accuracy in the absence of
noise. Various simulations illustrate our results.
Organization: We introduce our notation and basic pre-
liminaries in Section II and formulate the private distributed
optimization problem in Section III. Section IV presents the
rationale for our design strategy and Section V describes
a general framework for functional differential privacy. We
formulate our solution to the private distributed optimization
problem in Section VI. We present simulations in Section VII
and collect our conclusions and ideas for future work in Sec-
tion VIII. Appendix A gathers our results on the Lipschitzness
of the argmin map under suitable assumptions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce our notational conventions
and some fundamental facts about Hilbert spaces and robust
stability of discrete-time systems.
A. Notation
We use R, R>0, Z≥0, and N to denote the set of reals,
positive reals, nonnegative integers, and positive integers,
respectively. The space of scalar- and n-vector-valued infinite
sequences are denoted by RN and (Rn)N, respectively. Given
K ∈ N and an element η = {η(k)}∞k=0 of RN or (Rn)N, we
use the shorthand notation ηK = {η(k)}Kk=0. If the index of η
starts at k = 1, with a slight abuse of notation we also denote
{η(k)}Kk=1 by ηK . We denote by `2 ⊂ RN the space of square-
summable infinite sequences. We use | · |p and ‖ · ‖p for the p-
norm in finite and infinite-dimensional normed vector spaces,
respectively (we drop the index p for p = 2). We let B(c, r)
denote the closed ball with center c and radius r in Euclidean
space. For D ⊆ Rd, Do denotes its interior and L2(D)
and C2(D) denote the set of square-integrable measurable
functions and the set of twice continuously differentiable
functions over D, respectively. Throughout the paper, m(·)
denotes the Lebesgue measure. If {Ek}∞k=1 is a sequence of
subsets of Ω such that Ek ⊆ Ek+1 and E =
⋃
k Ek, then
we write Ek ↑ E as k → ∞. We say Ek ↓ E as k → ∞ if
Eck ↑ Ec as k →∞, where Ec = Ω \E is the complement of
E. Given any closed and convex subset S ⊆ H of a Hilbert
space, we denote by projS the orthogonal projection onto S.
We denote by K the set of strictly increasing continuous
functions α : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) such that α(0) = 0. A function
α belongs to K∞ if α ∈ K and limr→∞ α(r) =∞. We denote
by KL the set of functions β : [0,∞)× [0,∞)→ [0,∞) such
that, for each s ∈ [0,∞), r 7→ β(r, s) is nondecreasing and
continuous and β(0, s) = 0 and, for each r ∈ [0,∞), s 7→
β(r, s) is monotonically decreasing with β(r, s)→ 0 as s→
∞. A map M : X → Y between two normed vector spaces
is K-Lipschitz if there exists κ ∈ K∞ such that ‖M(x1) −
M(x2)‖Y ≤ κ(‖x1 − x2‖X) for all x1, x2 ∈ X .
The (zero-mean) Laplace distribution with scale b ∈ R>0 is
a continuous distribution with probability density function
L(x; b) = 1
2b
e−
|x|
b .
It is clear that L(x;b)L(y;b) ≤ e
|x−y|
b . We use η ∼ Lap(b) to denote
a random variable η with Laplace distribution. It is easy to
see that if η ∼ Lap(b), |η| has an exponential distribution
with rate λ = 1b . Similarly, we use the notation η ∼ N (µ, σ2)
when η is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2.
The error function erf : R→ R is defined as
erf(x) , 1√
pi
∫ x
−x
e−t
2
dt ≥ 1− e−x2 .
Therefore, P{|η| ≤ r} = erf(r/√2σ) if η ∼ N (0, σ2). Given
any random variable η and any convex function φ, Jensen’s in-
equality states that E[φ(η)] ≥ φ(E[η]). The opposite inequality
holds if φ is concave.
B. Hilbert Spaces and Orthonormal Bases
We review some basic facts on Hilbert spaces and refer
the reader to [21] for a comprehensive treatment. A Hilbert
space H is a complete inner-product space. A set {ek}k∈I ⊂
H is an orthonormal system if 〈ek, ej〉 = 0 for k 6= j and
〈ek, ek〉 = ‖ek‖2 = 1 for all k ∈ I . If, in addition, the set of
linear combinations of {ek}k∈I is dense in H, then {ek}k∈I is
an orthonormal basis. Here, I might be uncountable: however,
if H is separable (i.e., it has a countable dense subset), then
any orthonormal basis is countable. In this case, we have
h =
∞∑
k=1
〈h, ek〉ek,
for any h ∈ H. We define the coefficient sequence θ ∈ RN
by θk = 〈h, ek〉 for k ∈ N. Then, θ ∈ `2 and, by Parseval’s
identity, ‖h‖ = ‖θ‖. For ease of notation, we define Φ : `2 →
H to be the linear bijection that maps the coefficient sequence
θ to h. For an arbitrary D ⊆ Rd, Lp(D) is a Hilbert space
if and only if p = 2, and the inner product is the integral of
the product of functions. Moreover, L2(D) is separable. In the
remainder of the paper, we assume {ek}∞k=1 is an orthonormal
basis for L2(D) and Φ : `2 → L2(D) is the corresponding
linear bijection between coefficient sequences and functions.
C. Robust Stability of Discrete-Time Systems
We briefly present some definitions and results on robust
stability of discrete-time systems following [22]. Given the
vector field f : Rn × Rm → Rn, consider the system
x(k + 1) = f(x(k), η(k)), (1)
with state x : Z≥0 → Rn and input η : Z≥0 → Rm. Given
an equilibrium point x∗ ∈ Rn of the unforced system, we say
that (1) is
(i) 0-input locally asymptotically stable (0-LAS) relative to
x∗ if, by setting η = 0, there exists ρ > 0 and γ ∈ KL
such that, for every initial condition x(0) ∈ B(x∗, ρ),
we have for all k ∈ Z≥0,
|x(k)− x∗| ≤ γ(|x(0)− x∗|, k).
(ii) locally input-to-state stable (LISS) relative to x∗ if there
exist ρ > 0, γ ∈ KL, and κ ∈ K such that, for
every initial condition x(0) ∈ B(x∗, ρ) and every input
satisfying ‖η‖∞ ≤ ρ, we have
|x(k)− x∗| ≤ max{γ(|x(0)− x∗|, k), κ(|ηk−1|∞)}, (2)
for all k ∈ N. In this case, we refer to ρ as the robust
stability radius of (1) relative to x∗.
By definition, if the system (1) is LISS, then it is also 0-
LAS. The converse is also true, cf. [22, Theorem 1]. The
following result is a local version of [23, Lemma 3.8] and
states an important asymptotic behavior of LISS systems.
Proposition II.1. (Asymptotic gain of LISS systems): Assume
system (1) is LISS relative to x∗ with associated robust stability
radius ρ. If x(0) ∈ B(x∗, ρ) and ‖η‖∞ ≤ min{κ−1(ρ), ρ}
(where κ−1(ρ) =∞ if ρ is not in the range of κ), then
lim sup
k→∞
|x(k)− x∗| ≤ κ(lim sup
k→∞
|η(k)|).
In particular, x(k)→ x∗ if η(k)→ 0 as k →∞.
Proof: From (2), we have
|x(k)− x∗| ≤ max{γ(|x(0)− x∗|, k), κ(‖η‖∞)}
≤ max{γ(ρ, k), κ(‖η‖∞)}, (3)
where we have used x(0) ∈ B(x∗, ρ). Now, for each k ∈ N, let
η[k] ∈ (Rn)N be defined by η[k](`) = η(k+`) for all ` ∈ Z≥0.
If there exists k0 such that ‖η[k0]‖∞ = 0, then we need to
show that limk→∞ |x(k) − x∗| = 0. Since γ ∈ KL, there
exists K ∈ Z≥0 such that γ(ρ, k) ≤ ρ for all k ≥ K, and since
κ(‖η‖∞) ≤ ρ as well, it follows from (3) that x(k) ∈ B(x∗, ρ)
for all k ≥ K. Let k = max{k0,K}. Using (2), we get
|x(k)− x∗| ≤ γ(|x(k)− x∗|, k − k), ∀k > k,
and the result follows. Assume then that no k0 exists such
that ‖η[k0]‖∞ = 0. Let K0 = 0 and, for each j ∈ N, let
Kj be such that γ(ρ, k − Kj−1) ≤ κ(‖η[Kj−1]‖∞) for all
k ≥ Kj (this sequence is well-defined because γ ∈ KL).
Since κ(‖η[Kj−1]‖∞) ≤ κ(‖η‖∞) ≤ ρ, (2) holds if we set the
“initial” state to x(Kj−1) which implies that |x(k) − x∗| ≤
κ(‖η[Kj−1]‖∞) for all k ≥ Kj . Therefore,
lim sup
k→∞
|x(k)− x∗| ≤ κ(‖η[Kj ]‖∞), ∀j ∈ Z≥0.
The result follows by taking limit of both sides as j →∞.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a group of n agents whose communication topol-
ogy is described by a digraph G. Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
has a local objective function fi : D → R, where D ⊂ Rd is
convex and compact and has nonempty interior. We assume
that each fi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is convex and twice continuously
differentiable, and use the shorthand notation F = {fi}ni=1.
Consider the following convex optimization problem
minimize
x∈D
f(x) ,
n∑
i=1
fi(x)
subject to G(x) ≤ 0,
Ax = b,
where the component functions of G : D → Rm are convex,
A ∈ Rs×d, and b ∈ Rs. Denote by X ⊆ D the feasibility set.
The optimization problem can be equivalently written as,
minimize
x∈X
f(x). (4)
We assume that X is a global piece of information known to
all agents.
The group objective is to solve the convex optimization
problem (4) in a distributed and private way. By distributed,
we mean that each agent can only interact with its neighbors
in G. For privacy, we consider the case where the function
fi (or some of its attributes) constitute the local and sensitive
information known to agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} that has to be kept
confidential. Each agent assumes (the worst-case where) the
adversary has access to all the “external” information (includ-
ing all the network communications and all other objective
functions). This setting is sometimes called local (differential)
privacy in the literature, see e.g., [24]. In order to define
privacy, we first introduce the notion of adjacency. Given any
normed vector space (V, ‖ · ‖V) with V ⊆ L2(D), two sets
of functions F, F ′ ⊂ L2(D) are V-adjacent if there exists
i0 ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
fi = f
′
i , i 6= i0 and fi0 − f ′i0 ∈ V.
The set V is a design choice that we specify later in Sec-
tion V-B. Moreover, this definition can be readily extended
to the case where V is any subset of another normed vector
space W ⊆ L2(D). With this generalization, the conventional
bounded-difference notion of adjacency becomes a special
case of the definition above, where V is a closed ball around
the origin. We provide next a general definition of differential
privacy for a map.
Definition III.1. (Differential Privacy): Let (Ω,Σ,P) be a
probability space and consider a random map
M : L2(D)n × Ω→ X
from the function space L2(D)n to an arbitrary set X . Given
 ∈ Rn>0, the map M is -differentially private if, for any two
V-adjacent sets of functions F and F ′ that (at most) differ in
their i0’th element and any set O ⊆ X , one has
P{ω ∈Ω | M(F ′, ω) ∈ O} (5)
≤ ei0‖fi0−f ′i0‖VP{ω ∈ Ω | M(F, ω) ∈ O}. 
Essentially, this notion requires the statistics of the output
of M to change only (relatively) slightly if the objective
function of one agent changes (and the change is in V), making
it hard for an adversary who observes the output of M to
determine the change. In the case of an iterative asymptotic
distributed optimization algorithm, M represents the action
(observed by the adversary) of the algorithm on the set of local
functions F . In other words, M is the map (parameterized
by the initial network condition) that assigns to F the whole
sequence of messages transmitted over the network. In this
case, (5) has to hold for all allowable initial conditions. We
are ready to formally state the network objective.
Problem 1. (Differentially private distributed optimization):
Design a distributed and differentially private optimization
algorithm whose guarantee on accuracy improves as the level
of privacy decreases, leading to the exact optimizer of the
aggregate objective function in the absence of privacy. 
The reason for the requirement of recovering the exact
optimizer in the absence of privacy in Problem 1 is the
following. It is well-known in the literature of differential
privacy that there always exists a cost for an algorithm to
be differentially private, i.e., the algorithm inevitably suffers
a performance loss that increases as the level of privacy
increases. This phenomenon is a result of the noise added in
the mapM, whose variance increases as  decreases. With the
above requirement on the noise-free behavior of the algorithm,
we aim to make sure that the cause of this performance loss
is only due to the added noise and not to any other factor.
Example III.2. (Linear Classification with Logistic Loss
Function): We introduce here a supervised classification prob-
lem that will serve to illustrate the discussion along the paper.
Consider a database of training records composed by the
labeled samples {(ai, bi)}Ni=1, where each ai ∈ Rd (containing
the features of a corresponding object) may belong to one of
two possible classes and bi ∈ {−1, 1} determines to which
class it belongs. The goal is to train a classifier with the
samples so that it can automatically classify future unlabeled
samples. For simplicity, we let d = 2 and assume ai ∈ [0, 1]2
and bi ∈ {−1, 1} are independently and uniformly randomly
selected. The aim is to find the best hyperplane xTa that
can separate the two classes. The parameters x defining the
hyperplane can be found by solving the convex problem,
x∗ = argmin
x∈X
N∑
i=1
(
`(x; ai, bi) +
λ
2
|x|2
)
, (6)
where ` : Rd × Rd × R → R>0 is the loss function and
(λ/2)|x|2 is the regularizing term. Since the objective function
is strongly convex, we choose X large enough so that x∗ is the
same as the unique unconstrained minimizer. Popular choices
of ` are the logistic loss `(x; ai, bi) = ln(1+e−bia
T
i x) and the
hinge loss `(x; ai, bi) = max{0, 1− biaTi x}. We focus on the
logistic loss here due to its smoothness.
Consider a group of n agents, each one owning a portion
Nd = N/n of the training samples, who seek to collectively
solve (6) in a distributed fashion, i.e., only by communicating
with their neighbors (without a central aggregator). Various it-
erative algorithms have been proposed in the literature, cf. [2]–
[6], to address this problem. As an example, [2] proposes that
each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} starts with an initial estimate xi(0)
of x∗ and, at each iteration k, update its estimate as
xi(k + 1) = projX(zi(k)− αk∇fi(zi(k))), (7a)
zi(k) =
n∑
j=1
aijxj(k), (7b)
where {aij}nj=1 are the edge weights of the communication
graph at node i and αk is the stepsize. From (7b), one can
see that agents only need to share their estimates with their
neighbors to run the algorithm. Under reasonable connectivity
assumptions, one can show [2] that xi(k) converges to x∗
asymptotically if the sequence of stepsizes is square-summable
(
∑
k α
2
k < ∞) but not summable (
∑
k αk = ∞). In this
paper, we are interested in endowing distributed coordination
algorithms such as this with privacy guarantees so that their
execution does not reveal information about the local objective
functions to the adversary. 
IV. RATIONALE FOR DESIGN STRATEGY
In this section, we discuss two algorithm design strategies
to solve Problem 1 based on the perturbation of either inter-
agent messages or the local objective functions. We point
out an important limitation of the former, and this provides
justification for the ensuing design of our objective-perturbing
algorithm based on functional differential privacy.
A. Limitations of Message-Perturbing Strategies
We use the term message-perturbing strategy to refer to
the result of modifying any of the distributed optimization
algorithms available in the literature by adding (Gaussian or
Laplace) noise to the messages agents send to either neighbors
or a central aggregator in order to preserve privacy. A generic
message-perturbing distributed algorithm takes the form
x(k + 1) = aI(x(k), ξ(k)),
ξ(k) = x(k) + η(k),
(8)
where ξ, η : Z≥0 → Rn are the sequences of messages and
perturbations, respectively, and aI : Rn × Rn → Rn depends
on the agents’ sensitive information set I with associated
optimizer x∗I . This formulation is quite general and can also
encode algorithmic solutions for optimization problems other
than the one in Section III, such as the ones studied in [18],
[19]. In the problem of interest here, I = F = {fi}ni=1.
The following result provides conditions on the noise vari-
ance that ensure that the noise vanishes asymptotically almost
surely and remains bounded with nonzero probability.
Lemma IV.1. (Convergence and boundedness of Laplace and
normal random sequences with decaying variance): Let η be
a sequence of independent random variables defined over the
sample space Ω = RN, with η(k) ∼ Lap(b(k)) or η(k) ∼
N (0, b(k)) for all k ∈ N. Given r > 0, consider the events
E = {η ∈ Ω | lim
k→∞
η(k) = 0},
Fr = {η ∈ Ω | ∀k ∈ N |η(k)| ≤ r}.
If b(k) is O( 1kp ) for some p > 0, then P(E) = 1 and P(Fr) =
P(Fr ∩ E) > 0 for all r > 0.
Proof: First, consider the case where η(k) ∼ Lap(b(k)).
By the independence of the random variables and the fact that
|η(k)| is exponentially distributed with rate 1b(k) ,
P(Fr) =
∞∏
k=1
(
1− e− rb(k)
)
.
By assumption, b(k) ≤ ckp for all k ∈ N and some p, c > 0.
Thus, given that the series
∑∞
k=1 e
− rc kp converges [25, §1.14],
P(Fr) ≥
∞∏
k=1
(
1− e− rc kp
)
> 0.
Next, let E`,K = {η ∈ Ω | ∀k ≥ K |η(k)| < υ`}
where {υ`}∞`=1 is a monotonically decreasing sequence that
converges to zero as `→∞ (e.g., υ` = 1` ). Note that
E =
∞⋂
`=1
∞⋃
K=1
E`,K .
Since E`,K ↑
⋃∞
K=1E`,K for all ` ∈ N as K → ∞, and⋃∞
K=1E`,K ↓ E as `→∞, we have
P(E) = lim
`→∞
lim
K→∞
P(E`,K) = lim
`→∞
lim
K→∞
∞∏
k=K
(
1− e−
υ`
b(k)
)
≥ lim
`→∞
lim
K→∞
∞∏
k=K
(
1− e− υ`c kp
)
= 1.
Then, P(Fr ∩ E) = P(Fr) − P(Fr ∩ Ec) = P(Fr) > 0. For
the case of normal distribution of random variables,
P{|η(k)| ≤ r} = erf
(
r√
2b(k)
)
≥ 1− e− r
2
2b(k) ,
and the results follows from the arguments above.
Note that Lemma IV.1 also ensures that the probability
that the noise simultaneously converges to zero and remains
bounded is nonzero. One might expect that Lemma IV.1 would
hold if b(k) → 0 at any rate. However, this is not true. For
instance, if b(k) = 1log k , one can show that the probability
that η(k) eventually remains bounded is zero for any bound
r ≤ 1, so the probability that η(k)→ 0 is zero as well.
The following result shows that a message-perturbing al-
gorithm of the form (8) cannot achieve differential privacy
if the underlying (noise-free) dynamics are asymptotically
stable. For convenience, we employ the short-hand notation
a˜I(x(k), η(k)) = aI(x(k), x(k) + η(k)) to refer to (8).
Proposition IV.2. (Impossibility result for 0-LAS message-
perturbing algorithms): Consider any algorithm of the
form (8) with either ηi(k) ∼ Lap(bi(k)) or ηi(k) ∼
N (0, bi(k)). If a˜I is 0-LAS relative to x∗I for two information
sets I and I ′ with different optimizers x∗I 6= x∗I′ and
associated robust stability radii ρ and ρ′, respectively, bi(k)
is O( 1kp ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and some p > 0, and at least
one of the following holds,
(i) x∗I is not an equilibrium point of x(k+1) = a˜I′(x(k), 0)
and a˜I′ is continuous,
(ii) x∗I belongs to the interior of B(x
∗
I′ , ρ
′),
then, the algorithm cannot preserve the -differentially privacy
of the information set I for any  > 0.
Proof: Our proof strategy consists of establishing that,
if the initial state is close to the equilibrium of the system
for one information set, the state trajectory converges to that
equilibrium with positive probability but to the equilibrium of
the system with the other information set with probability zero.
We then use this fact to rule out differential privacy. For any
fixed initial state x0, if either of ξ or η is known, the other one
can be uniquely determined from (8). Therefore, the mapping
ΞI,x0 : (Rn)N → (Rn)N such that
ΞI,x0(η) = ξ
is well-defined and bijective. Let κ, κ′ ∈ K be as in (2)
corresponding to a˜I and a˜I′ , respectively. Consider as initial
condition x0 = x∗I and define
R =
{
η ∈ Ω | ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, lim
k→∞
ηi(k) = 0
and |ηi(k)| ≤ min
{
κ−1(ρ), ρ
}
, ∀k ∈ N}.
By Lemma IV.1, we have P(R) > 0. By Proposition II.1,
since |x0 − x∗I | = 0 ≤ ρ and ‖η‖∞ ≤ min
{
κ−1(ρ), ρ
}
for all η ∈ R, the sequence ΞI,x0(η) converges to x∗I .
Let O = ΞI,x0(R) and R′ = Ξ−1I′,x0(O) (where we are
using the forward and inverse images of sets, respectively).
Next, we show that no η′ ∈ R′ converges to 0 under either
hypothesis (i) or (ii) of the statement. Under (i), there exists a
neighborhood of (x∗I , 0) ∈ R2n in which the infimum of the
absolute value of at least one of the components of a˜I′(x, η)
is positive, so whenever (x, η) enters this neighborhood, it
exits it in finite time. Therefore, given that any x ∈ O
converges to x∗I , no η
′ ∈ R′ can converge to zero. Under
(ii), there exists a neighborhood of x∗I included in B(x
∗
I′ , ρ
′).
Since ΞI′,x0(η
′) → x∗I , there exists K ∈ N such that
ΞI′,x0(η
′)(k) belongs to B(x∗I′ , ρ
′) for all k ≥ K. Therefore,
if |η′(k)| ≤ min{(κ′)−1(ρ′), ρ′} indefinitely after any point
of time, ΞI′,x0(η
′) → x∗I′ by Proposition II.1 which is a
contradiction, so η′ cannot converge to zero. In both cases,
by Lemma IV.1, P(R′) = 0, which, together with P(R) > 0
and the definition of -differential privacy, cf. (5), implies the
result.
Note that the hypotheses of Proposition IV.2 are mild and
easily satisfied in most cases. In particular, the result holds
if the dynamics are continuous and globally asymptotically
stable relative to x∗I for two information sets. The main take-
away message of this result is that a globally asymptotically
stable distributed optimization algorithm cannot be made dif-
ferentially private by perturbing the inter-agent messages with
asymptotically vanishing noise. This observation is at the core
of the design choices made in the literature regarding the use
of stepsizes with finite sum to make the zero-input dynamics
not asymptotically stable, thereby causing a steady-state error
in accuracy which is present independently of the amount of
noise injected for privacy. For instance, the algorithmic solu-
tion proposed in [17] replaces (7b) by zi(k) =
∑n
j=1 aijξj(k),
where ξj(k) = xj(k)+ηj(k) is the perturbed message received
from agent j, and chooses a finite-sum sequence of stepsizes
{αk} in the computation (7a), leading to a dynamical system
which is not 0-GAS, see Figure 1. Similar observations can
be made in the scenario considered in [18], where the agents’
local constraints are the sensitive information (instead of the
objective function). This algorithmic solution uses a constant-
variance noise, which would make the dynamics unstable
if executed over an infinite time horizon. This problem is
circumvented by having the algorithm terminate after a finite
number of steps, and optimizing this number offline as a
function of the desired level of privacy .
B. Algorithm Design via Objective Perturbation
To overcome the limitations of message-perturbing strate-
gies, here we outline an alternative design strategy to solve
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Fig. 1. Privacy-accuracy trade-off for the algorithm proposed in [17] applied
to Example III.2 with D = X = [−5, 5]2, n = 10, Nd = 100, and
λ = 0.01. With that paper’s notation, we set q = 0.1, p = 0.11, c = 0.5. The
stepsize αk = cqk−1 has finite sum. The circles, dotted line, and solid line
illustrate simulation results for 50 executions, their best linear fit in logarithmic
scale, and the upper bound on accuracy provided in [17], respectively. We have
broken the vertical axis to better display the scale of the algorithm output.
Problem 1 based on the perturbation of the agents’ objective
functions. The basic idea is to have agents independently
perturb their objective functions in a differentially private way
and then have them participate in a distributed optimization
algorithm with the perturbed objective functions instead of
their original ones. In the context of Example III.2, this
would correspond to leave (7b) and the sequence of step-
sizes unchanged, and instead use perturbed functions in the
computation (7a). The latter in turn automatically adds noise
to the estimates shared with neighbors. The following result,
which is a special case of [26, Theorem 1], ensures that the
combination with the distributed optimization algorithm does
not affect the differential privacy at the functional level.
Proposition IV.3. (Resilience to post-processing): Let M :
L2(D)
n × Ω → L2(D)n be -differentially private (cf. Def-
inition III.1) and F : L2(D)n → X , where (X ,ΣX ) is an
arbitrary measurable space. Then, F ◦M : L2(D)n×Ω→ X
is -differentially private.
Proof: First, note that although a slightly different defini-
tion of differential privacy is used in [26], the exact same proof
of [26, Theorem 1] works with Definition III.1. Consider the
σ-algebra P(L2(D)n) on L2(D)n where P denotes the power
set. With the notation of [26, Theorem 1], M2 = F ◦M is a
deterministic function of the output of M1 = M. Then, it is
easy to verify that, for any S ∈ ΣX ,
P(M2(F ) ∈ S |M1(F )) = χS(F(M1(F ))),
(with χ· being the indicator function) is measurable as a
function of M1(F ) (because F and S are trivially measurable)
and defines a probability measure on (X ,ΣX ) (associated to a
singleton), so it is a probability kernel. Hence, the conditions
of [26, Theorem 1] are satisfied and F ◦M is -differentially
private.
Our design strategy based on the perturbation of individual
objective functions requires solving the following challenges:
(i) establishing a differentially private procedure to perturb
the individual objective functions;
(ii) ensuring that the resulting perturbed functions enjoy
the smoothness and regularity properties required by
distributed optimization algorithms to converge;
(iii) with (i) and (ii) in place, characterizing the accuracy of
the resulting differentially private, distributed coordina-
tion algorithm.
Section V addresses (i) and Section VI deals with (ii)
and (iii).
V. FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
We explore here the concept of functional differential pri-
vacy to address the challenge (i) laid out in Section IV-B. The
generality of this notion makes it amenable for problems where
the sensitive information is a function or some of its attributes
(e.g., sample points, optimizers, derivatives and integrals). For
simplicity of exposition and without loss of generality, we
limit our discussion in this section to the privacy of a single
function.
A. Functional Perturbation via Laplace Noise
Let f ∈ L2(D) be a function whose differential privacy has
to be preserved. With the notation of Section II, we decompose
f into its coefficients Φ−1(f) and perturb this sequence by
adding noise to all of its elements. Specifically, we set
M(f,η) = Φ (Φ−1(f) + η) = f + Φ(η), (9)
where
ηk ∼ Lap(bk), (10)
for all k ∈ N. Clearly, for η to belong to `2 and for the series
in Φ(η) to converge, the scales {bk}∞k=1 cannot be arbitrary.
The next result addresses this issue.
Lemma V.1. (Sufficient condition for boundedness of per-
turbed functions): If there exists K ∈ N such that, for some
p > 12 and s > 1,
bk ≤ 1
kp log ks
, ∀k ≥ K, (11)
then η defined by (10) belongs to `2 with probability one. In
particular, if for some p > 12 and γ > 0,
bk ≤ γ
kp
, ∀k ∈ N, (12)
then η defined by (10) belongs to `2 with probability one.
Proof: Equation (11) can be equivalently written as
e
− 1kpbk ≤ 1ks , for k ≥ K. In particular, this implies that∑∞
k=1 e
− 1kpbk is convergent. Therefore [25, §1.14],∏∞k=1 (1−
e
− 1kpbk
)
converges (i.e., the limit exists and is nonzero), so
1 = lim
K→∞
∞∏
k=K
(
1− e− 1kpbk
)
= lim
K→∞
P(EK),
where EK =
{
η ∈ RN | ∀k ≥ K, |ηk| ≤ 1kp
}
and we have
used the fact that |ηk| is exponentially distributed with rate
1
bk
. Since EK ↑
⋃∞
K=1EK as K →∞, we have
1=P
( ∞⋃
K=1
EK
)
=P
{
η ∈ RN |∃K ∈ N s.t. ∀k ≥ K: |ηk|≤ 1
kp
}
≤ P{η ∈ `2},
as stated. If equation (12) holds, we define p¯ = 12 (p+
1
2 ) and
equivalently write (12) as
bk ≤ 1
kp¯
γ
kp−p¯
, ∀k ∈ N.
Since p− p¯ > 0, for any s > 1 there exists K ∈ N such that
kp−p¯ ≥ γ log ks for all k ≥ K, and the result follows.
Having established conditions on the noise variance under
which the map (9) is well defined, we next turn our attention
to establish its differential privacy.
B. Differential Privacy of Functional Perturbation
Here, we establish the differential privacy of the map (9).
In order to do so, we first specify our choice of adjacency
space V . Given q > 1, consider the weight sequence {kq}∞k=1
and define the adjacency vector space to be the image of the
resulting weighted `2 space under Φ, i.e.,
Vq = Φ
({
δ ∈ RN |
∞∑
k=1
(kqδk)
2 <∞}). (13)
It is not difficult to see that Vq is a vector space. Moreover,
‖f‖Vq ,
( ∞∑
k=1
(kqδk)
2
) 1
2
, with δ = Φ−1(f),
is a norm on Vq . The next result establishes the differential
privacy of (9) for a properly chosen noise scale sequence b.
Theorem V.2. (Differential privacy of functional perturba-
tion): Given q > 1, γ > 0 and p ∈ ( 12 , q − 12), let
bk =
γ
kp
, k ∈ N. (14)
Then, the map (9) is -differentially private with
 =
1
γ
√
ζ(2(q − p)), (15)
where ζ is the Riemann zeta function.
Proof: Note that the mapM defined by (9) is well defined
because (14) ensures, by Lemma V.1, that η belongs to `2
almost surely. Our proof consists of showing that M satisfies
the definition of differential privacy, cf. Definition III.1. To
this effect, consider two functions f and f ′, with f−f ′ ∈ Vq ,
and an arbitrary set O ⊆ L2(D). Let Φ−1K : L2(D)→ RK be
the map that returns the first K coefficients of Φ−1(·) and
LK(ηK ;bK) ,
K∏
k=1
L(ηk; bk).
We have
P{f + Φ(η) ∈ O} = P{η ∈ Φ−1(O − f)}
= lim
K→∞
∫
Φ−1K (O−f)
LK(ηK ;bK)dηK ,
where Φ−1K (O − f) denotes the inverse image of the set
O−f = {g ∈ L2(D) | g+f ∈ O} and the second equality fol-
lows from the continuity of probability [27, Theorem 1.1.1.iv]
(since Φ−1K (O−f)×RN ↓ Φ−1(O−f) as K →∞). Similarly,
P{f ′ + Φ(η′) ∈ O} = lim
K→∞
∫
Φ−1K (O−f ′)
LK(η′K ;bK)dη′K .
By linearity of ΦK , we have Φ−1K (O−f ′) = Φ−1K (O−f)+δK
where δ = Φ−1(f − f ′). Therefore,
P{f ′+Φ(η′) ∈ O} = lim
K→∞
∫
Φ−1K (O−f)
LK(ηK + δK ;bK)dηK .
Note that
LK(ηK + δK ;bK)
LK(ηK ;bK)
=
K∏
k=1
L(ηk + δk; bk)
L(ηk; bk) ≤ e
∑K
k=1
|δk|
bk .
After multiplying both sides by LK(ηK ;bK), integrating over
Φ−1K (O − f), and letting K →∞, we have
P{f ′ + Φ(η′) ∈ O} ≤ e
∑∞
k=1
|δk|
bk P{f + Φ(η) ∈ O}.
Finally, the coefficient of the exponential can be upper
bounded using Holder’s inequality with p = q = 2 as
∞∑
k=1
|δk|
bk
=
∞∑
k=1
kq|δk|
kqbk
≤
( ∞∑
k=1
1
(kqbk)2
) 1
2
( ∞∑
k=1
(kqδk)
2
) 1
2
=
( ∞∑
k=1
1
(γkq−p)2
)1
2
‖f − f ′‖Vq =
1
γ
√
ζ(2(q−p)) ‖f − f ′‖Vq ,
which completes the proof.
Remark V.3. (Choice of q): The choice of parameter q affects
the trade-off between the size of the adjacency space Vq and
the noise required for privacy. From (13), we see that decreas-
ing q makes Vq larger, allowing for the privacy preservation
of a larger collection of functions. However, as expected,
preserving privacy in a larger space requires more noise. From
(12), γ will be larger for a fixed , (since p cannot be decreased
by the same amount as q and ζ is monotonically decreasing),
resulting in larger bk and larger noise. We show later in
Theorem VI.2 that the guaranteed upper bound on the expected
minimizer deviation also increases as {qi}ni=1 decrease. 
VI. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE DISTRIBUTED
OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we employ functional differential privacy
to solve the differentially private distributed optimization
problem formulated in Section III for a group of n ∈ N
agents. For convenience, we introduce the shorthand notation
S0 = C2(D) ⊂ L2(D) and, for given u > 0, 0 < α < β,
S = {h ∈ S0 | |∇h(x)| ≤ u, ∀x ∈ D
and αId ≤ ∇2h(x) ≤ βId, ∀x ∈ Do},
for twice continuously differentiable functions with bounded
gradients and Hessians. In the rest of the paper, we assume that
the agents’ local objective functions f1, . . . , fn belong to S .
A. Smoothness and Regularity of the Perturbed Functions
We address here the challenge (ii) laid out in Section IV-B.
To exploit the framework of functional differential privacy for
optimization, we need to ensure that the perturbed functions
have the smoothness and regularity properties required by
the distributed coordination algorithm. In general, the output
of (9) might neither be smooth nor convex. We detail next
how to address these problems by defining appropriate maps
that, when composed with M in (9), yield functions with the
desired properties. Proposition IV.3 ensures that differential
privacy is retained throughout this procedure.
1) Ensuring Smoothness: To ensure smoothness, we rely on
the fact that S0 is dense in L2(D) and, therefore, given any
function g in L2(D), there exists a smooth function arbitrarily
close to it, i.e.,
∀ε > 0, ∃gˆs ∈ S0 such that ‖g − gˆs‖ < ε.
Here, ε is a design parameter and can be chosen sufficiently
small (later, we show how to do this so that the accuracy of
the coordination algorithm is not affected).
Remark VI.1. (Smoothening and Truncation): A natural
choice for the smoothening step, if the basis functions are
smooth (i.e., {ek}∞k=1 ⊂ S0), is truncating the infinite ex-
pansion of g. Such truncation is also inevitable in practical
implementations due to the impossibility of handling infinite
series. The appropriate truncation order depends on the specific
function, the basis set, and the noise decay rate (p in (14)). 
2) Ensuring Strong Convexity and Bounded Hessian: The
next result ensures that the orthogonal projection from S0 onto
S is well defined, and can therefore be used to ensure strong
convexity and bounded Hessian of the perturbed functions.
Proposition VI.2. (Convexity of S and its closedness relative
to S0): The set S is convex and closed as a subset of S0 under
the 2-norm.
Proof: The set S is clearly convex because, if h1, h2 ∈ S
and λ ∈ [0, 1], then for all x ∈ Do,
∇2((1− λ)h1(x) + λh2(x)) = (1− λ)∇2h1(x) + λ∇2h2(x)
≥ (1− λ)αId + λαId = αId.
Similarly, ∇2((1− λ)h1(x) + λh2(x)) ≤ βId. Also,
|∇((1− λ)h1(x) + λh2(x))| ≤ (1− λ)|∇h1(x)|+ λ|∇h2(x)|
≤ (1− λ)u+ λu ≤ u,
for all x ∈ D. To establish closedness, let
S1 = {h ∈ S0 | αId ≤ ∇2h(x) ≤ βId, ∀x ∈ Do},
S2 = {h ∈ S0 | |∇h(x)| ≤ u, ∀x ∈ D}.
Since S = S1 ∩ S2, it is enough to show that S1 and S2 are
both closed subsets of S0.
To show that S1 is closed, let {hk}∞k=1 be a sequence
of functions in S1 such that hk ‖·‖2−−→ h ∈ S0. We show
that h ∈ S1. Since hk − α2 |x|2
‖·‖2−−→ h − α2 |x|2 and L2
convergence implies pointwise convergence of a subsequence
almost everywhere, there exists {hk`}∞`=1 and Y ⊂ D such
that m(D \ Y ) = 0 and hk`(x) − α2 |x|2 → h(x) − α2 |x|2 for
all x ∈ Y . It is straightforward to verify that Y is dense in D
and therefore Y ∩Do is dense in Do. Then, by [28, Theorem
10.8], h − α2 |x|2 is convex on Do, so αI2 ≤ ∇2h(x) for all
x ∈ Do. Similarly, one can show that ∇2h(x) ≤ βId for all
x ∈ Do. Therefore, h ∈ S1.
The proof of closedness of S2 is more involved. By contra-
diction, assume that {hk}∞k=1 is a sequence of functions in S2
such that hk
‖·‖2−−→ h ∈ S0 but h /∈ S2. Therefore, there exist
x0 ∈ Do such that |∇h(x0)| > u and, by continuity of ∇h,
δ0 > 0 and υ0 > 0 such that
|∇h(x)| ≥ u+ υ0, ∀x ∈ B(x0, δ0) ⊆ D.
Let u0 =
∇h(x0)
|∇h(x0)| . By continuity of ∇h, for all υ1 > 0 there
exists δ1 ∈ (0, δ0] such that
∇h(x) · u0 ≥ (1− υ1)|∇h(x)|, ∀x ∈ B(x0, δ1).
As mentioned above, L2 convergence implies pointwise con-
vergence of a subsequence {hk`}∞`=1 almost everywhere. In
turn, this subsequence converges to h almost uniformly, i.e.,
for all υ2 > 0 and all υ3 > 0, there exist E ⊂ D and L ∈ N
such that m(E) < υ2 and
|hk`(x)− h(x)| < υ3, ∀x ∈ D \ E and ` ≥ L. (16)
For ease of notation, let δ2 = δ1/2. Using the fundamental
theorem of line integrals [29], for all x ∈ B(x0, δ2) \ E,
h(x+ δ2u0)− h(x) =
∫ x+δ2u0
x
∇h · dr
=
∫ x+δ2u0
x
∇h · u0|dr| ≥
∫ x+δ2u0
x
(1− υ1)|∇h||dr|
≥ (1− υ1)(u+ υ0)δ2. (17)
Similarly, for all x ∈ B(x0, δ2) \ E and all ` ∈ N,
hk`(x+ δ2u0)− hk`(x) =
∫ x+δ2u0
x
∇hk` · dr
≤
∫ x+δ2u0
x
|∇hk` ||dr| ≤ uδ2. (18)
Putting (17), (18), and (16) together and choosing υ3 = υ1δ2u,
we have for all x ∈ B(x0, δ2) \ E and all ` ≥ L,
h(x+ δ2u0)−hk`(x+ δ2u0) (19)
≥ h(x)− hk`(x) + δ2(1− υ1)(u+ υ0)− δ2u
≥ δ2(1− υ1)(u+ υ0)− δ2(1 + υ1)u , υ4.
The quantity υ4 can be made strictly positive choosing υ1 =
υ0
4u+3υ0
> 0. Let E+ = E + δ2u0 and x1 = x0 + δ2u0. Then,
(19) can be rewritten as
h(x)− hk`(x) ≥ υ4, ∀x ∈ Nδ2(x1) \ E+ and ` ≥ L,
which, by choosing υ2 = 12m(B(x1, δ2)), implies∫
Nδ2 (x1)\E+
|h(x)− hk`(x)|2dx ≥ υ24 ·m(B(x1, δ2) \ E+)
⇒ ‖h− hk`‖ ≥ υ4
√
m(B(x1, δ2))/2 > 0.
This contradicts hk`
‖·‖2−−→ h, so S2 must be closed.
Given the result in Proposition VI.2, the best approximation
in S of a function h ∈ S0 is its unique projection onto S, i.e.,
h˜ = projS(h).
By definition, h˜ has bounded gradient and Hessian.
B. Algorithm Design and Analysis
We address here the challenge (iii) laid out in Section IV-B
and put together the discussion above to propose a class of
differentially private, distributed optimization algorithms that
solve Problem 1. Unlike the message-perturbing algorithms
where agents use the original objective functions in the com-
putations and rely on perturbing the inter-agent messages,
here we propose that agents locally perturb their objective
functions and use them in their computations, without adding
any additional noise to the inter-agent messages. Therefore,
we require each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} to first compute
fˆi =M(fi,ηi) = fi + Φ(ηi), (20a)
where ηi is a sequence of Laplace noise generated by i
according to (10) with the choice (14), then select fˆsi ∈ S0
such that
‖fˆi − fˆsi ‖ < εi, (20b)
and finally compute
f˜i = projS(fˆ
s
i ). (20c)
After this process, agents participate in any distributed op-
timization algorithm with the modified objective functions
{f˜i}ni=1. Let
x˜∗ = argmin
x∈X
n∑
i=1
f˜i and x∗ = argmin
x∈X
n∑
i=1
fi,
denote, respectively, the output of the distributed algorithm
and the optimizer for the original optimization problem (with
objective functions {fi}ni=1). The following result establishes
the connection between the algorithm’s accuracy and the
design parameters.
Theorem VI.3. (Accuracy of the proposed class of distributed,
differentially private coordination algorithms): Consider a
group of n agents which perturb their local objective functions
according to (20) with Laplace noise (10) of variance (14),
where qi > 1, γi > 0, and pi ∈
(
1
2 , qi − 12
)
for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let the agents participate in any distributed
coordination algorithm that asymptotically converges to the
optimizer x˜∗ of the perturbed aggregate objective function.
Then, i-differential privacy of each agent i’s original objec-
tive function is preserved with i =
√
ζ(2(qi − pi))/γi and
E |x˜∗ − x∗| ≤
n∑
i=1
κn
(
γi
√
ζ(2pi)
)
+ κn(εi),
where the function κn ≡ κnα,nβ ∈ K∞ is defined in
Proposition A.2.
Proof: Since the distributed algorithm is a post-processing
step on the perturbed functions, privacy preservation of the
objective functions follows from Theorem V.2 and Proposi-
tion IV.3. For convenience, let
∆ = E |x˜∗ − x∗| = E
∣∣∣ argmin
x∈X
n∑
i=1
f˜i − argmin
x∈X
n∑
i=1
fi
∣∣∣.
Since µnα,nβ is convex and belongs to class K∞ (so is
monotonically increasing), κn is concave and belongs to class
K∞ and so is subadditive. Therefore, using Proposition A.2,
∆ ≤ E
[
κn
(∥∥∥ n∑
i=1
f˜i −
n∑
i=1
fi
∥∥∥)]
≤ E
[
κn
( n∑
i=1
‖f˜i − fi‖
)]
≤
n∑
i=1
E
[
κn
(‖f˜i − fi‖)].
Then, by the non-expansiveness of projection, we have
∆ ≤
n∑
i=1
E
[
κn
(‖fˆsi − fi‖)]
≤
n∑
i=1
E
[
κn
(‖fˆsi − fˆi‖)+ κn(‖fˆi − fi‖)]
≤
n∑
i=1
(
κn(εi) + E
[
κn
(‖ηi‖)]). (21)
By invoking Jensen’s inequality twice, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
E
[
κn(‖ηi‖)
] ≤ κn(E[‖ηi‖]) = κn(E[√‖ηi‖2]) (22)
≤ κn
(√
E
[‖ηi‖2])=κn(√∑∞
k=1
b2i,k
)
=κn
(
γi
√
ζ(2pi)
)
.
The result follows from (21) and (22).
The following result describes the trade-off between accu-
racy and privacy. The proof follows by direct substitution.
Corollary VI.4. (Privacy-accuracy trade-off): Under the hy-
potheses of Theorem VI.3, if pi = qi2 in (14) for all i, then
E |x˜∗ − x∗| ≤
n∑
i=1
κn
(
ζ(qi)
i
)
+ κn(εi). (23)
In Corollary VI.4, qi and i are chosen independently, which
in turn determines the value of γi according to (15). Also,
it is clear from (23) that in order for the accuracy of the
coordination algorithm not to be affected by the smoothening
step, each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} has to take the value of εi
sufficiently small so that it is negligible relative to ζ(2pi)/i.
In particular, this procedure can be executed for any arbitrarily
large value of i, so that in the case of no privacy requirements
at all, perfect accuracy is recovered, as specified in Problem 1.
Remark VI.5. (Accuracy bound for sufficiently large do-
mains): One can obtain a less conservative bound than (23) on
the accuracy of the proposed class of algorithms if the min-
imizers of all the agents’ objective functions are sufficiently
far from the boundary of X . This can be made precise via
Corollary A.3. If the aggregate objective function satisfies (28)
and the amount of noise is also sufficiently small so that the
minimizer of the sum of the perturbed objective functions
satisfies this condition, then invoking Corollary A.3, we have
E |x˜∗ − x∗| ≤ L
n2
n∑
i=1
(
γ
2
d+4
i ζ(2pi)
1
d+4 + ε
2
d+4
i
)
=
L
n2
n∑
i=1
[(
ζ(qi)
i
) 2
d+4
+ ε
2
d+4
i
]
,
where the equality holds under the assumption that pi = qi2
in (14) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. 
VII. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we report simulation results of our algorithm
for Example III.2 with D = X = [−5, 5]2, n = 10,
Nd = 100, and λ = 0.01. The orthonormal basis of L2(D)
is constructed from the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of
the Taylor functions and the series is truncated to the second,
sixth, and fourteenth orders, resulting in 15, 28, and 120-
dimensional coefficient spaces, respectively. This truncation
also acts as the smoothening step described in Section VI-A1,
where higher truncation orders result in smaller ε. We evaluate
the projection operator in (20c) by numerically solving the
convex optimization problem minf˜i∈S ‖f˜i − fˆsi ‖, where fˆsi
is the result of the truncation. The parameters of S are
given by α = Ndλ, β = Ndλ + NdrD
√
2 + e2rD , and
u =
√
2Nd(λrD + e
2rD ) where rD = 5. Rather than
implementing any specific distributed coordination algorithm,
we use an iterative interior-point algorithm on f˜ and f to find
the perturbed x˜∗ and original x∗ optimizers, respectively (these
points correspond to the asymptotic behavior of any provably
correct distributed optimization algorithm with the perturbed
and original functions, respectively).
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Fig. 2. Privacy-accuracy trade-off curve of the proposed class of distributed,
differentially private algorithms in Section VI-B for Example III.2 (with the
same data as Figure 1) and different truncation orders. Left: empirical data and
its best piecewise linear fit for 6th-order truncation of the function expansions,
together with the theoretical upper bound of Corollary VI.4. Right: piecewise
linear fit of empirical data for 2nd, 6th, and 14th order truncations as well as
the theoretical upper bound. Accuracy improves with the truncation order.
The privacy levels are chosen the same for all agents,
i.e.,  = (, , · · · , ), and  is swept logarithmically over
[10−2, 103]. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we set qi = 2pi = 1.1
and γi =
√
ζ(2(qi − pi))/. For each value of  and truncation
order, the simulations are repeated 20 times to capture the
stochasticity of the solutions. Figure 2 illustrates the error
|x˜∗ − x∗| as a function of  for different truncation orders,
together with the best linear fit of log |x˜∗ − x∗| against
log , and the upper bound obtained in Corollary VI.4. The
conservative nature of this upper bound can be explained
by noting the approximations leading to the computation of
κn in Proposition A.2, suggesting that there is room for
refining this bound. Figure 2 shows that accuracy keeps im-
proving as the privacy requirement is relaxed until the ε-term
(resulting from the smoothening/truncation) dominates the
error. This “saturation” value can be decreased by increasing
the truncation order (which comes at the expense of more
computational complexity), in contrast with the behavior of
message-perturbing algorithms, cf. Figure 1. It is important to
mention that the respective error values for a fixed  cannot
be compared between Figures 1 and 2 because, in [17],  is
defined as the total exponent in (5), i.e., i0‖fi0 − f ′i0‖V .
However, it can be seen that the accuracy in Figure 1 is
almost indifferent to the value of  and is in the same order
as rD = 5. This is explained by the impossibility result of
Proposition IV.2: since the noise-free algorithm of [17] is not
asymptotically stable, depending on the specific application,
its accuracy may not be desirable regardless of the value of .
In contrast, the accuracy in Figure 2 keeps improving as  is
increased (with an appropriate choice of truncation order).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have studied the distributed optimization of the sum of
local strongly convex objective functions by a group of agents
subject to the requirement of differential privacy. We have
established the incompatibility between differential privacy
and the asymptotic stability of the underlying (noise-free)
dynamics for coordination strategies based on the perturbation
of the messages among agents. This has motivated us to
develop a new framework for differentially private release of
functions from the L2 space that can be applied to arbitrary
separable Hilbert spaces. We have also carefully described how
perturbed functions with the desired regularity requirements
can be provided to any distributed coordination algorithm
while preserving privacy. Finally, we upper bounded the
accuracy of the resulting class of distributed, differentially
private coordination algorithms. Future work will analyze how
to relax the smoothness and convexity assumptions on the local
objective functions and the compactness hypothesis on their
domains, characterize the optimal privacy-accuracy trade-off
curve of distributed coordination algorithms based on objective
perturbation, characterize the expected suboptimality gap of
distributed coordination algorithms for a given desired level
of privacy, provide procedures for choosing the truncation
order of the functional expansion based on the objective
function properties (which must itself be differentially private),
compare the numerical efficiency of different orthonormal
bases for the L2 space, and further understand the appropriate
scale of the privacy parameter for specific application domains.
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APPENDIX A
K-LIPSCHITZ PROPERTY OF THE argmin MAP
Here, we establish the Lipschitzness of the argmin map un-
der suitable assumptions. This is a strong result of independent
interest given that argmin is not even continuous for arbitrary
C2 functions. Our accuracy analysis for the proposed class of
distributed, differentially private algorithms in Section VI-B
relies on this result. We begin with a lemma stating a geometric
property of balls contained in convex, compact domains.
Lemma A.1. (Minimum portion of balls contained in convex
compact domains): Assume D ⊂ Rd is convex, compact, and
has nonempty interior and let rD > 0 denote its inradius.
Then, there exists λD ∈ (0, 1) such that,
m(B(x, r) ∩D) ≥ λDm(B(x, r)),
for any x ∈ D and r ≤ rD.
Proof: Let B(cD, rD) be the inball of D, i.e., the largest
ball contained in D. If this ball is not unique, we pick one
arbitrarily. Since Do 6= ∅, rD > 0. Let RD be the radius
of the largest ball centered at cD that contains D. Since D
is compact, RD < ∞. For any x ∈ D that is on or outside
of B(cD, rD), let Σ be the intersection of B(cD, rD) and the
hyperplane passing through cD and perpendicular to cD − x.
Consider the cone C = conv(Σ ∪ {x}) where conv denotes
convex hull. Since D is convex, C ⊆ D. Note that C has half
angle θx = tan−1 rD|x−cD| so the solid angle at its apex is
Ωθx =
2pi
d−1
2
Γ(d−12 )
∫ θx
0
sind−2(φ)dφ. (24)
Therefore, for any r ≤ rD, the proportion ΩθxΩd of B(x, r) is
contained in D where Ωd = 2pi
d
2
Γ( d2 )
is the total d-dimensional
solid angle. For any x inside B(cD, rD), the same argument
holds with
θx = max|x−cD|≥rD
tan−1
rD
|x− cD| =
pi
4
.
Therefore, for arbitrary x ∈ D, the statement holds with
λD = min
x∈D
Ωθx
Ωd
=
1
Ωd
Ωtan−1(rD/RD). 
We are now ready to establish the K-Lipschitzness of the
argmin map.
Proposition A.2. (K-Lipschitzness of argmin): For any two
functions f, g ∈ S,∣∣ argmin
x∈X
f − argmin
x∈X
g
∣∣ ≤ κα,β(‖f − g‖), (25)
where κα,β ∈ K∞ is given by
κ−1α,β(r) =
α2pi
d
2
d2d+3Γ(d2 )
λD
(
rD
dD
)d
r4µdα,β(r), ∀r ∈ [0,∞),
rD and λD are as in Lemma A.1, dD is the diameter of D,
and µα,β ∈ K∞ is defined for all r ∈ [0,∞) by
µα,β(r) =
αr2
2
√
αβr2 + 2(β + α)ur + 4u2
.
Proof: We consider the case where a =
argminx∈X f(x) 6= argminx∈X g(x) = b since the
statement is trivial otherwise. Let ma = f(a), mb = g(b),
m = ma −mb, ua = ∇f(a), and ub = ∇g(b). Without loss
of generality, assume m ≥ 0. Define,
fl(x) =
α
2
|x− a|2 + uTa (x− a) +ma,
gu(x) =
β
2
|x− b|2 + uTb (x− b) +mb,
for all x ∈ D. Since f, g ∈ S, we can integrate ∇2f ≥ αId
and ∇2g ≤ βId twice to get,
∀x ∈ D fl(x) ≤ f(x) and g(x) ≤ gu(x). (26)
It follows that, for all x ∈ D,
|f(x)− g(x)| ≥ [fl(x)− gu(x)]+ ≥ [fl(x)− gu(x)−m]+,
where [z]+ = max{z, 0} for any z ∈ R. After some
computations, we get
fl(x)− gu(x)−m = −β − α
2
(
|x− c|2 − r2
)
,
where
c =
βb− αa+ ua − ub
β − α ,
r2 =
αβ|a− b|2
(β − α)2 +
|ua − ub|2
(β − α)2 +
2(βua − αub)T (b− a)
(β − α)2 .
Therefore, the region where fl − gu − m ≥ 0 is B(c, r).
Next, we seek to identify a subset inside this ball where we
can determine a strictly positive lower bound of fl − gu that
depends on the difference |a − b|. To this effect, note that
b ∈ B(c, r), since
r2 − |c− b|2 = α
β − α |a− b|
2 +
2
β − αu
T
a (b− a),
and, by the convexity of the problem, uTa (b − a) ≥ 0. Let
r = r − |c− b| > 0 be the radius of the largest ball centered
at b and contained in B(c, r). We have,
r2 − |c− b|2 = (r − |c− b|)(r + |c− b|) ≥ α
β − α |a− b|
2
⇒ r ≥
α
β−α |a− b|2
r + |c− b| ≥
α
β−α |a− b|2
2r
≥ µα,β(|a− b|),
where in the last inequality, we have used |ua|, |ub| ≤ u. Next,
note that for all x ∈ B(c, r+|c−b|2 ),
fl(x)− gu(x)−m ≥
− β − α
2
(r2 + |c− b|2 + 2r|c− b|
4
− r2
)
. (27)
Using the bound 2r|c− b| ≤ r2 + |c− b|2, we get after some
simplifications,
(fl − gu)(x)−m ≥ α
4
|a− b|2 + 1
2
uTa (b− a) ≥
α
4
|a− b|2,
for all x ∈ B(b, r2 ) ⊂ B(c, r+|c−b|2 ). Therefore,
‖f − g‖2 =
∫
D
|f(x)− g(x)|2dx
≥
∫
D
([fl(x)− gu(x)−m]+)2dx
≥
∫
B(b, r2 )∩D
(fl(x)− gu(x)−m)2dx
≥ α
2
16
|a− b|4m (B(b, r2 ) ∩D)
≥ α
2
16
|a− b|4m
(
B(b,
µα,β(|a−b|)
2 ) ∩D
)
.
Now, we invoke Lemma A.1 to lower bound the last term.
Note that µα,β(|a − b|) ≤ |a − b| ≤ dD for all a, b ∈ D.
Therefore, rDdD
µα,β(|a−b|)
2 ≤ min{rD, µα,β(|a− b|)/2}, so by
Lemma A.1,
‖f − g‖2 ≥ α
2
16
|a− b|4m
(
B
(
b,
rDµα,β(|a− b|
2dD
)
∩D
)
≥ α
2
16
|a− b|4λD 2pi
d
2
dΓ(d2 )
rdD
2dddD
(µα,β(|a− b|))d,
which yields (25).
The next result shows that if the minimizers of f and g are
sufficiently far from the boundary of D, then their gradients
need not be uniformly bounded and yet one can obtain a less
conservative characterization of the K-Lipschitz property of
the argmin map.
Corollary A.3. (K-Lipschitzness of argmin for sufficiently
large domains): If f and g belong to S1 = {h ∈ S0 | αId ≤
∇2h(x) ≤ βId, ∀x ∈ Do} and
argmin
x∈X
f(x), argmin
x∈X
g(x) ∈ B(cD, rD) ∩Xo, (28)
where rD =
β−α
α+β+2
√
αβ
rD and B(cD, rD) ⊂ D, then∣∣ argmin
x∈X
f − argmin
x∈X
g
∣∣ ≤ L‖f − g‖ 2d+4 ,
where
L =
d(d+ 2)(d+ 4)(β − α)d+2Γ(d/2)
4(αβ)d/2+2pid/2
.
Proof: The proof follows in the same lines as the proof of
Proposition A.2 (and we use here the same notation). Since the
minimizers of f and g lie in the interior of X , ua = ub = 0.
The main difference here is that due to (28), we have for all
x ∈ B(c, r) that
|x− cD| ≤ |x− c|+ |c− b|+ |b− cD|
≤ α+
√
αβ
β − α 2rD + rD = rD,
so B(c, r) ⊂ D. Therefore, one can integrate (fl − gu −m)2
on the whole B(c, r) instead of its lower bound (27) on the
smaller ball B(c, r+|c−b|2 ). To explicitly calculate the value
of the resulting integral, one can use the change of variables
xi = ci + ry
1/2
i , i ∈ {1, . . . , d} and then use the formula
∀ai > −1,
∫
Sd
ya11 · · · yadd dy =
Γ(a1 + 1) · · ·Γ(ad + 1)
Γ(a1 + · · ·+ ad + d+ 1) ,
where Sd = {y ∈ Rd |
∑d
i=1 yi = 1 and yi ≥ 0, i ∈
{1, . . . , d}}. The result then follows from straightforward
simplifications of the integral.
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